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Zhaorun Lin 林昭潤 (Kevin)
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blog
DLMM/LB VS AMM
Published:
AMM vs DLMM: how they price swaps, how LPs earn fees, and when discretized liquidity beats constant-product pools.
Uniswap V1 to V4: The Evolution of Decentralized Exchanges
Published:
A deep dive into Uniswap’s evolution, exploring AMM, concentrated liquidity, and hooks.
blog_zh
jobs
jobs_zh
portfolio
projects
Smart Carpark
Published:
• Awarded the HKUST Best FYP Award and the Huawei FYP award for the year 22/23.
projects_zh
publications
Blind Vote: Economical and Secret Blockchain-based Voting
Published in IEEE Blockchain, 2024
Abstract — Electronic voting has been a hot research topic for decades and has recently garnered much attention due to the invention of programmable blockchains that support smart contracts. This is the ideal framework and technology for electronic voting since voting protocols implemented as smart contracts automatically inherit many desired properties from the underlying blockchain, e.g. verifiability, transparency and pseduonymity. However, the public and decentralized nature of the blockchain allows all transactions to be traced by everyone and thus voters’ choices would be disclosed publicly. There are many solutions to make blockchain-based voting fully anonymous and untraceable. A recent example is Tornado Vote [1] (ICBC 2023). Such protocols often rely on zero-knowledge proofs, especially zkSNARKS, to achieve secrecy and break the link between a voter’s public key and vote. However, verifying these proofs on-chain is expensive and uses a considerable amount of gas (execution fees).
Recommended citation: A. K. Goharshady and Z. Lin, "Blind Vote: Economical and Secret Blockchain-Based Voting," in 7th IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain), 2024, pp. 46-53.
Download Paper
Improved Gas Optimization of Smart Contracts
Published in FSEN, 2025
Abstract — Smart contracts are programs executed on top of a blockchain consensus protocol. Their compiled code (bytecode) is stored on the blockchain and is immutable after deployment. They are self-enforcing in the sense that any function call to a smart contract is executed by all nodes on the network, ensuring that they all reach consensus about the final state of the contract. To prevent denial-of-service attacks, such an execution is costly by design. A “gas” cost is assigned to each bytecode operation, roughly proportional to the resources required to execute it, and any user who initiates a function call to a smart contract has to pay the total gas cost of the resulting execution. On Ethereum alone, the users pay an astounding gas cost of more than 4 billion USD/year.
Recommended citation: T. Barakbayeva, S. Farokhnia, A. K. Goharshady, P. Li, Z. Lin, "Improved Gas Optimization of Smart Contracts," in 11th International Conference on Fundamentals of Software Engineering (FSEN), 2025, pp 1-10.
Download Paper
Fast and Gas-efficient Private Sealed-bid Auctions
Published in PODC, 2025
Abstract — In decentralized blockchain environments, auctions must ensure fairness, trustless execution and bid confidentiality while operating efficiently within resource-constrained smart contracts. We propose a new family of algorithms for private, trustless auctions that protect bidder identities and bid values while remaining practical for smart contract execution. Our approach builds on top of the Dutch auction model and a stepwise revelation tree. Bidders commit to their bids using cryptographic commitment schemes and later confirm their honest following of the protocol through zero-knowledge proofs, ensuring that only the highest bid is disclosed while all other bids remain (probabilistically) confidential. A key innovation is the use of a reveal tree, which structures the bidding process into logarithmically many rounds, reducing the total number of messages to \(O(\log n)\) and thereby significantly lowering gas costs and execution times. We further explore variants introducing fake bids to optimize our probabilistic privacy guarantees.
Recommended citation: J. Ballweg, A.K. Goharshady, Z. Lin, "Fast and Gas-efficient Private Sealed-bid Auctions," in 44th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 2025, pp 169-172.
Download Paper
MPhil Thesis - Novel Blockchain-based Protocols for Electronic Voting and Auctions
Published in Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, 2025
Abstract — Programmable blockchains have long been a hot research topic given their tremendous use in decentralized applications. Smart contracts, using blockchains as their underlying technology, inherit the desired properties such as verifiability, immutability, and transparency, which make it a great suit in trustless environments.
publications_zh
Blind Vote: Economical and Secret Blockchain-based Voting
发表于 IEEE Blockchain 2024
摘要 — Electronic voting has been a hot research topic for decades and has recently garnered much attention due to the invention of programmable blockchains that support smart contracts. This is the ideal framework and technology for electronic voting since voting protocols implemented as smart contracts automatically inherit many desired properties from the underlying blockchain, e.g. verifiability, transparency and pseduonymity. However, the public and decentralized nature of the blockchain allows all transactions to be traced by everyone and thus voters’ choices would be disclosed publicly. There are many solutions to make blockchain-based voting fully anonymous and untraceable. A recent example is Tornado Vote [1] (ICBC 2023). Such protocols often rely on zero-knowledge proofs, especially zkSNARKS, to achieve secrecy and break the link between a voter’s public key and vote. However, verifying these proofs on-chain is expensive and uses a considerable amount of gas (execution fees).
Recommended citation: A. K. Goharshady and Z. Lin, "Blind Vote: Economical and Secret Blockchain-Based Voting," in 7th IEEE International Conference on Blockchain (Blockchain), 2024, pp. 46-53.
Download Paper
Improved Gas Optimization of Smart Contracts
发表于 FSEN 2025
摘要 — Smart contracts are programs executed on top of a blockchain consensus protocol. Their compiled code (bytecode) is stored on the blockchain and is immutable after deployment. They are self-enforcing in the sense that any function call to a smart contract is executed by all nodes on the network, ensuring that they all reach consensus about the final state of the contract. To prevent denial-of-service attacks, such an execution is costly by design. A “gas” cost is assigned to each bytecode operation, roughly proportional to the resources required to execute it, and any user who initiates a function call to a smart contract has to pay the total gas cost of the resulting execution. On Ethereum alone, the users pay an astounding gas cost of more than 4 billion USD/year.
Recommended citation: T. Barakbayeva, S. Farokhnia, A. K. Goharshady, P. Li, Z. Lin, "Improved Gas Optimization of Smart Contracts," in 11th International Conference on Fundamentals of Software Engineering (FSEN), 2025, pp 1-10.
Download Paper
Fast and Gas-efficient Private Sealed-bid Auctions
发表于 PODC 2025
摘要 — In decentralized blockchain environments, auctions must ensure fairness, trustless execution and bid confidentiality while operating efficiently within resource-constrained smart contracts. We propose a new family of algorithms for private, trustless auctions that protect bidder identities and bid values while remaining practical for smart contract execution. Our approach builds on top of the Dutch auction model and a stepwise revelation tree. Bidders commit to their bids using cryptographic commitment schemes and later confirm their honest following of the protocol through zero-knowledge proofs, ensuring that only the highest bid is disclosed while all other bids remain (probabilistically) confidential. A key innovation is the use of a reveal tree, which structures the bidding process into logarithmically many rounds, reducing the total number of messages to $O(logn)$ and thereby significantly lowering gas costs and execution times. We further explore variants introducing fake bids to optimize our probabilistic privacy guarantees.
Recommended citation: J. Ballweg, A.K. Goharshady, Z. Lin, "Fast and Gas-efficient Private Sealed-bid Auctions," in 44th ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing (PODC), 2025, pp 169-172.
Download Paper
MPhil Thesis - Novel Blockchain-based Protocols for Electronic Voting and Auctions
发表于 香港科技大学 2025
摘要 — Programmable blockchains have long been a hot research topic given their tremendous use in decentralized applications. Smart contracts, using blockchains as their underlying technology, inherit the desired properties such as verifiability, immutability, and transparency, which make it a great suit in trustless environments.
talks
teaching
Computer Organization
Undergraduate course, CSE, HKUST, 2024
Worked as a teaching assistant that hosted lab sessions to give students hands-on experience of Logisim.
teaching_zh
计算机组织
Undergraduate course, CSE, HKUST, 2024
Worked as a teaching assistant that hosted lab sessions to give students hands-on experience of Logisim.
zh
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Zhaorun Lin 林昭潤 (Kevin)
About me